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From the events of September 11, 2011, the United States learned a large-scale disaster 
can strike without warning. President Bush issued a series of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directives (HSPD) intended to increase coordination among response 
agencies. However, despite the enactment of the HSPD, coordination and collaboration 
among response agencies is significantly lacking with respect to radiological emergency 
planning and preparedness activities. Planning for nuclear/radiological events is unique in 
that they often occur with no notice, with great complexity, and require broad scenario 
planning to cover the important potential contingencies. Radiological events demand that 
actions be taken by responsible organizations in a timely and effective manner to mitigate 
consequences on populations, infrastructure and environment. This thesis is intended to 
help officials better understand the many factors that impact coordination and 
collaboration. These factors range from information sharing to multidisciplinary 
participation. This thesis will also assist officials in better understanding the Capabilities 
Based Planning Model and how it may be implemented to enhance radiological 
emergency planning and preparedness. The elements included in this paper are intended 
to enhance the planning and associated decisions made by all partners involved in local 
radiological planning efforts. In conclusion, the thesis recommends enhancing 
radiological emergency planning and preparedness at the local level, through integrating 
the jurisdictions approach with the use of the Capabilities Based Planning Model to 
encourage performance partnership and collaborative methods. 
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A. COLLABORATIVE RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE PLANNING 
Effective and efficient preparedness efforts require inclusion and participation of 
multiple disciplines across various levels of private and public entities. According to 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance, “preparedness is the foundation of a 
successful national incident management system involving all levels of government and 
other non-governmental organizations “as necessary.”1 It is difficult to measure the 
extent to which multiple disciplines are engaged and participate in radiological/nuclear 
planning efforts, as state and local determinations of what agencies/organizations are 
deemed necessary is quite subjective.  
While some may view this generalized statement by DHS beneficial, as states and 
localities under “home rule” are free to include disciplines as they deem necessary, it 
may also lead organizations to give insufficient attention to external relationships. This 
lack of coordination and cooperation may be attributed to unclear federal policies and 
procedures that have been interpreted differently by state and local organizations.  
Radiological events necessitate a broad range of flexible response capabilities as 
the threat is ever changing, dynamic and complex. Multi-disciplinary capabilities that 
may be utilized in responding to a radiological event are often not addressed as many 
agencies plan within silos, failing to address relevant partners governmental and non-
governmental as well as private entities. This can be problematic, as according to the 
National Response Framework (NRF), United States disaster management follows the 
principle of federalism for emergency management, or bottom to top approach.2 Local 
authorities have primary responsibility for initial and sustained emergency response, 
disaster management, recovery and mitigating long-term health and environmental 
1 United States Government Accountability Office (2010). Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Actions 
Needed To Better Prepare To Recover From Possible Attacks Using Radiological Materials (GAO-10-
204). Retrieved from U.S. Government Printing Office, http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/301288.pdf.  
2 Francis X. McCarthy and Jared T. Brown, Congressional Primer on Major Disasters and 
Emergencies, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.; “Who is in Charge?,” 5, retrieved from 
Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41981.pdf. 
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consequences. Therefore, the responsibility for multiagency multidisciplinary 
coordination and collaboration should sit with local authorities. 
Because of the complex nature of emergencies and the potential scope of their 
consequences, preparedness and response arrangements, for their management should 
involve multiple organizations and entities in various jurisdictions.3 Formal agreements 
among agencies may serve as a baseline for measuring inter-agency coordination and 
information sharing.4 In 2004, The Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists 
distributed questionnaires to individuals within state health departments to evaluate 
planning and preparedness for a radiological/chemical event.5 Overall, respondents 
reported a lack of planning and preparedness for a radiological/chemical event; 48–67% 
of the respondents had not  established Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) with agencies 
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), water regulators, food regulators, 
agricultural agencies, hazardous waste regulators, local environmental health agencies, 
American Red Cross, military, National Guard, mental health departments, or academic 
institutions.6  
The apparent lack of agreements prompted further study by the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), which examined coordination between DHS 
and Health and Human Services (HHS) for the development of their Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) risk assessments. The GAO report identified a 
lack of DHS interagency agreements or written procedures for development of terrorism 
risk assessments and material threat assessments.7 The GAO further noted in the study 
that in the 2006 Risk Assessment report, DHS did not have inter-agency development or 
3 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 
Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency Agency 
(2010): 1–69. 
4 A National Assessment of The Status Of Planning For Public Health Preparedness For Chemical 




7 United States Government Accountability Office (2011). DHS and HHS Can Further Strengthen 
Coordination For Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Risk Assessments (GAO-11-606). 
Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319831.pdf 
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review of the risk assessment; nor did it have interagency working groups or other 
structures to regularly request and receive partner input.8  
Limited or lack of multi-disciplinary collaboration in radiological response 
planning is a significant gap at the federal, state and local government level. 
Collaboration and information sharing form a necessary foundation for dealing with both 
natural and manmade disasters, as these events require shared authority, dispersion of 
responsibilities, and allocation of mutual resources. This thesis recommends the 
application of a Capabilities Based Planning (CBP) model to the current radiological 
response planning strategy to enhance collaboration among agencies and organizations.  
The thesis first provides an overview of the current radiological planning strategy, 
identifying the need for enhanced collaboration. Second, it presents an overview of the 
variables impacting collaborative radiological response planning. Third, it provides an 
overview of CBP concepts and methodology. Finally, it offers recommendations for 
enhancing collaboration by means of implementation of the CBP model to the current 
government radiological response planning strategy.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
The primary research method utilized in the development of this thesis was 
program evaluation, by means of qualitative research methods. The purpose of the study 
was to examine the current United States government strategy for radiological response 
planning; and to what extent multiple disciplines and agencies are included in 
radiological response planning. The exploratory study aimed to identify strengths and 
shortfalls of the current strategy and examine recommendations for improvement.  
The primary method of qualitative research utilized was documentary analysis.9 
Documentary analysis provided the opportunity to analyze critical documents. Data 
collection was conducted utilizing university and government wide libraries, to include 
various databases, such as the Homeland Security Digital Library, Lexis-Nexis, BOSUN, 
EBSCO Host and Springer Link. Sampling was purposeful in selecting information rich 
8 Ibid. 
9 Merriam, Sharan B. Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation. San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey- Bass, 2009. 
 3 
                                                 
documents that meet the needs of the study and specifically related to the stated research 
question. The data sample included secondary sources, comprising written materials and 
official documents such as minutes from meetings, planning papers, journals, reports, 
newsletters, files and statistics as well as books.10  Resources were collated, interpreted, 
criticized and synthesized.11 
Data were included from different informational sources (data triangulation), as a 
means of testing the consistency of the data across different sources and reducing bias.12 
For example, documents were gathered from all levels of government as well as private 
sector and non-governmental organizations to ensure various vantage points were 
considered. Additionally, the sampling of documents included those stemming from the 
original implementation of radiological response planning to current date. The samples 
encompassed the historical account of radiological preparedness, a review of the 
implementation of such strategy, its mutations, as well as the outcome and 
recommendations for alterations to the current strategy as it relates to multi- agency 
collaboration.  
The primary method of data analysis utilized in the development of this thesis was 
coding, whereby labels were systemically assigned to segments of data so that sections 
with similar content could be connected across data.13 The type of coding utilized was 
thematic coding. Thematic coding required a detailed review of the text to identify and 
build themes and ideas about the data.14  The data analysis was conducted in a series of 
steps.  
The first step was to canvass a variety of potential sources and develop a broad 
overview of the elements relating to the research question and what means there were to 
10 Thomas, Gail Fann. “Research Methods: Qualitative Data Analysis.” Graduate School of Business 
& Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School 
11 Bardach, Eugene. A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis. 3rd. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009. 
12 Merriam, Sharan B. Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation. San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass, 2009. 
13 Braun, V. and Clarke, V., “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology.” Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3 (2006): 77–101. 
14 Thomas, Gail Fann. “Research Methods: Qualitative Data Analysis.” Graduate School of Business 
& Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. 
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learn about them.15 The second step was to manually generate initial codes by utilizing 
colored tabs, highlighting text, and writing codes in the margins to identify important 
points, contradictions and inconsistencies, common themes, comparisons and contrasts 
with other data, etc. In the third step, codes were reviewed to identify major themes or 
patterns.16  The fourth step was to conduct a review of the themes. The final step of the 
data analysis included defining and naming themes, whereby themes with related patterns 
were combined and catalogued into sub-themes.17  As part of the fourth and fifth step, a 
thematic map was created to provide an overall conception of the data patterns and the 
relationship among the themes.   
 
15 Bardach, Eugene. A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis. 3rd edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2009. 
16 Thomas, Gail Fann. “Research Methods: Qualitative Data Analysis.” Graduate School of Business 
& Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. 
17 Braun and Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology,”  77–101. 
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II. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES RADIOLOGICAL 
PLANNING 
A. FEDERAL PLANNING EFFORTS 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has had radiological 
responsibilities since 1970.18 The General Services Administration expanded the EPA 
role in 1975 and assigned roles to other various federal agencies.19 At this time, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was primarily responsible for emergency 
planning and preparedness as it pertained to radiological/nuclear events. The Three Mile 
Island Nuclear Power Plant accident of March 1979, lead to key changes in radiological 
response planning as crucial lessons about safety and crisis management were learned 
from the accident. Additionally, significant problems in the response of federal agencies 
were also identified as an opportunity for improvement. In July of 1979, President Carter 
established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by Executive Order. 
FEMA assumed the NRC role of coordinating emergency planning and preparedness 
activities outside the boundaries of NRC facilities.20 
In June of 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization, Public Law 
96-295, Section 304, required that the President prepare and publish a “National 
Contingency Plan.” This “National Contingency Plan” was subsequently renamed in 
1996 as the United States Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP).21 
The objective of the plan was to establish an organized and integrated capability for 
timely, coordinated response by Federal agencies to peacetime radiological emergencies. 
A broad range of federal agencies participated in the plan, with clearly stated 
responsibilities and/or capabilities. 




21Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan.” Last modified 
May 07, 1996. Accessed October 1, 2013. http://www.fas.org/nuk/guide/usa/doctrine/national/frerp.htm. 
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In 2008, the United States Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan was 
replaced by the National Response Framework. The National Response Framework was 
developed, in an effort to establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident 
management. The replacement of the FRERP with the NRF was a fundamental shift in 
the national planning approach as it shifted from the specific to the general.  
 8 
III. FEDERAL PLANNING STRATEGY 
A. PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 8 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8 was signed on March 30, 2011, and 
replaced Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 (National Preparedness), 
and HSPD- 8 Annex 1 (National Planning) (except for paragraph 44 of HSPD-8 Annex 
I).22  PPD-8 aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States 
through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of 
the United States. PPD-8 states “Our national preparedness is the shared responsibility of 
all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens.”23  
Furthermore, this directive sought to “galvanize action by the Government” and facilitate 
“an integrated, all-of-Nation, capabilities-based approach to preparedness.”24 The 
directive called for a series of integrated National Planning Frameworks (NPF) to be built 
upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and 
responsibilities to deliver necessary capabilities.25  Key principles of PPD 8 include: 
• Employ an all-of-nation/whole community approach, integrating efforts across 
federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governments and with private sector, 
community, non-governmental, and individual partners 
• Use a risk-based approach to support preparedness 
• Build core capabilities to confront any challenge 
• Integrate efforts across Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and 
Recovery 
• Assess performance outcomes to measure and track progress 
The aforementioned key principles are woven into the NPF and provide a 
foundation for planning efforts aimed to enhance capabilities.  
22 Obama, Barack. United States. The White House. Presidential Policy Directive. Washington, DC, 
2011. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.pdf.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013). Overview of the National Planning Frameworks. 
Retrieved from , http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=7361 
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1. National Planning Frameworks 
PPD-8 directed that one framework be developed for each of the five mission 
areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response and Recovery. To date, the Federal 
Government and its partners have released four (4) of five (5) proposed National 
Planning Frameworks (NPF).26  Each NPF documents the roles and responsibilities of 
the whole community in all aspects of preparedness; however, the roles and 
responsibilities are more general than specific and serve only as a guide for planners to 
use in local strategic planning efforts. The intent of the NPF was to provide a macro level 
outline of how the nation coordinates, shares information and collaborates to ensure a 
more secure and resilient nation.  
The frameworks follow a whole community approach to preparedness, 
recognizing that everyone can contribute to, and benefit from national preparedness 
efforts. The term “whole community” is all-inclusive, as it incorporates individuals and 
families (to include special populations and those with functional needs), businesses, 
community and faith-based groups, nonprofit organizations and all levels of 
government.27 Under the NPF, core capabilities are scalable, flexible, and adaptable. 
Therefore, the capabilities may be executed as needed to address a diverse range of 
threats and hazards. Flexibility within the NPF supports communities in organizing their 
efforts to address a variety of risks based on their unique needs, capabilities, 
demographics, governing structures and non-traditional partners.28  
2. National Preparedness Guidelines 
Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, in cooperation with 
private and non-profit sectors, each have unique roles in supporting the preparedness 
framework established by the National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG).29 According to 




29 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Guidelines. Washington, 
DC, 2007.   
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plans, the capacity of community, faith-based, and other nongovernmental 
organizations.30 This guidance is aligned with the whole community approach. As 
depicted in Figure 1, this integration includes engaging such organizations in the 
planning process, providing necessary training and credentialing of their personnel, 
providing necessary resource support for involvement in joint response, and 
incorporating the organizations in training and exercises.31   
The National Preparedness System (NPS) provides opportunities for all levels of 
government, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and individual citizens to 
work together to achieve priorities and capabilities. However, while the NPS provides 
opportunities and makes recommendations, it does not mandate collaborative efforts, as it 
functions merely as guidance.  
 
 
Figure 1. National Preparedness System32 
30 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Guidelines. Washington, 




                                                 
B. TARGET CAPABILITIES LIST 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Target Capabilities List (TCL) 
defines thirty-seven specific capabilities that all levels of government should possess in 
order to respond effectively to incidents. Capabilities may be defined as “combinations of 
resources that provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from 
performance of one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and performance 
standards.”33 Aligned with the central objective of Capabilities-Based Planning, the TCL 
provides target levels of capabilities that federal, state, local, and tribal entities must 
achieve to perform critical tasks for homeland security missions.34  The TCL serves as a 
resource for planners as it includes objectives, tasks, and measures for evaluation. 
Implementation at the state and local levels, however, is not fully embraced, and at times 
may be partially, if at all, integrated into planning efforts.   
According to the Department of Homeland Security, the TCL was intended to 
define capabilities in an effort to cope with diverse homeland security scenarios and to 
delineate conditions and measures of performance.35 Conditions may include weather or 
the number of casualties, among many other environmental variables that affect task 
performance.36  More specifically, measures and performance criteria describe a standard 
for how well a task must be performed and on the basis for varying levels of acceptable 
task performance. For example, to  assess a jurisdiction’s ability to perform radiological 
response tasks, planners may utilize numerous TCL to include performance criteria 
outlined in the Prevent Mission Area: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 
Explosives (CBRNE) Detection, Respond Mission: Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) and Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination Target Capabilities. 
In addition to serving as a resource for measuring, assessing and evaluating 
performance, the TCL may also be considered a tool for expanding regional 
33 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Guidelines. Washington, 
DC, 2007.   
34 United States. Department of Homeland Security. Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the 




                                                 
collaboration. Expanded Regional Collaboration is identified as the first priority in the 
National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG).37 Large-scale events may require a shared 
response across jurisdictions, levels of government, and the public/private sectors 
depending on the scale of the event.38  Planners would be well-advised to organize an 
expanded region to facilitate the strengthening of relationships among participants, and 
regional preparedness planning and operations support, as well as joint implementation of 
a capabilities-based approach.39  
National Preparedness Guidelines also recommend the establishment of multi-
jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary working groups consisting of representatives from 
various entities located within multiple jurisdictions.40 A collaborative approach may 
take form in three steps. First, a working group would first determine how best to achieve 
the capabilities. Second, a decision would determine where the capabilities should be 
built and maintained. Finally, priorities would be established to manage the use of limited 
resources.  
Within the TCL, Prevent Mission Area: CBRNE Detection, the theme of 
collaboration is also prominent. Training, communication, close coordination with key 
partners (including intelligence, law enforcement, public safety, public health, 
international partners, public and private sector awareness of CBRNE threats) are all 
recognized as critical enablers for the CBRNE Detection capability.41  Similarly, the 
Respond Mission: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Hazardous Materials 
Response and Decontamination Target Capability also require significant collaboration in 
addition to enhanced information sharing efforts to successfully perform radiological 
response tasks. 
37 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Guidelines. Washington, 




41 United States. Department of Homeland Security. Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the 
National Preparedness Guidelines. 2007.   
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It may be important to note here, in 2011, the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) 
was released with a list of thirty-one new “Core Capabilities”42 that targets for each 
capability remain either preliminary or incomplete in the National Preparedness Goal of 
2011 (to include those which are relevant to radiological and nuclear emergency 
planning), which has not been revised to date. A crosswalk document released by FEMA 
attempts to link the thirty-seven Target Capabilities with the thirty-one Core Capabilities, 
but is “not meant as official FEMA doctrine.”43 
C. SCENARIO PLANNING 
Scenario planning can be quite helpful in nuclear/radiological disaster planning as 
such events are difficult to predict, and therefore speculating upon the variety of possible 
scenarios may assist in preparing for the most likely or plausible events. Scenario 
building can be complex and subtle as they rely primarily on insight rather than formal 
analysis.44 Scenario planning is challenging as planners need enough scenarios to cover 
the important possible contingencies, yet few enough to be manageable.45 Additionally, 
considerable attention should be given to convincing management to do what seems best 
with a given scenario. A common view of the situation is supported by implementation of 
the Incident Command Structure and National Response Framework (as mentioned in the 
previous section). The intent of scenario planning is not to formalize the strategy per se, 
but to improve the decisions that are made both in building strategy and execution of 
actions in a real event.  
1. National Planning Scenarios 
According to the National Preparedness Guidelines, the National Planning 
Scenarios as well as the Target Capabilities List are both Capabilities-Based 
42 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Core Capabilities.” Last modified 2011. Accessed 
October 5, 2013. http://www.fema.gov/core-capabilities.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Mintzberg, Henry, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel. Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through 
The Wilds of Strategic Management. New York: Free Press, 1998.  
45 Ibid. 
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Preparedness tools.46 The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security placed 
particular emphasis on preparing for catastrophic threats with “the greatest risk of mass 
casualties, massive property loss, and immense social disruption.”47  The 2007 National 
Planning Scenarios (fifteen in total), illustrates the potential scope, magnitude, and 
complexity of a range of high consequence events, to include terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies.48  The National Planning Scenarios were developed 
with the premise that if a jurisdiction plans for a “major event,” the same jurisdiction will 
be more adept to respond to a wide scale of emergencies. The National Planning 
Scenarios may be used by all levels of government as a reference to explore the potential 
consequences of major events and to evaluate and improve their capabilities to perform 
their assigned missions and tasks.49  In planning for a “major event,” jurisdictions are 
naturally challenged with their own unique resource needs and planning constraints, and 
are encouraged to identify means to address specific gaps.  
 
  
46 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Guidelines. Washington, 
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IV. FACTORS IMPACTING RADIOLOGICAL PLANNING 
COLLABORATION 
A. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING 
The effectiveness of a plan may be measured by the extent to which it is 
comprehensive and comprehensible. This is especially true for terrorist incidents, as there 
is often ingenuity in panning as well as adaptability, relying on surprise to overcome 
security measures. Therefore, agencies involved in radiological planning would be well 
advised to implement a method based on capabilities which is more flexible, 
comprehensive, and comprehendible in its approach to contingency planning.50 The 
process of contingency planning and resource allocation poses one of the greatest 
challenges because of the severity and diversity of the threats and the required timeliness 
of defensive operations and security responses. A capabilities-based planning method 
would support a comprehensive and comprehensible plan by producing a series of 
options for decision-makers that is directly related to radiological response capabilities 
and linked to specific and necessary resources.  
B. MULTIDISCIPLINARY PARTICIPATION 
Aligned with the whole-community approach, preparedness should be introduced 
as the responsibility of every level of government, every department, and every agency 
consistent with its authorities. However, often times departments and agencies who may 
have an integral role in radiological response are left out of the planning process. Threat 
identification and risk assessment may be utilized in identifying partners within and 
across jurisdictional and geographic borders. Preparedness activities, however, must be 
coordinated to ensure identification and fulfillment of roles and responsibilities among 
partners. Such coordination may be organized under the Capabilities Based Framework, 
as it provides for private sector and nongovernmental organizations to be involved, as 
50 Goss, Thomas., Building a Contingency Menu: Using Capabilities-Based Planning for Homeland 
Defense and Homeland Security, Homeland Security Affairs, Volume I, Issue 1, 2005 
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=1.1.5. 
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they are critical players in prevention, vulnerability reduction, and response and recovery 
strategies and actions. 
Planners would be well advised to coordinate preparedness across the same multi-
agency coordination entities as described in the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS).51 This is the basis for implementing the National Preparedness Guidelines, 
particularly the national priority to Expand Regional Collaboration. A notable challenge 
for state and local planning efforts is that the federal model for multi-disciplinary 
involvement and participation has been somewhat unsuccessful because federal agencies 
often do not comply with their own recommendations.52  Moreover, the Department of 
Homeland Security’s attempt to involve state and local government officials, national 
associations, and other federal agencies involved in homeland security has been more 
characteristic of a consultative relationship rather than a partnering, collaborative 
relationship.  
The involvement of multiple levels of government as well as other agencies and 
organizations has not been initiated in the planning stages. Requests for involvement 
from the federal level has occurred much later in the process and relied on reaction in the 
form of requirements for rapid comment on a draft product. As a result there is often 
push-back, confusion about intent and requirements, as well as an inherent lack of 
understanding of radiological response, roles, and responsibilities.  
Contrary to the federal approach, state and local planners would be well advised 
to generate a partnership in developing a strategic approach to radiological response. 
Ideally, all strategic partners should be identified and their needs should be clearly 
represented in a collaborative decision-making process. Diversifying and expanding the 
partners involved in radiological response may also be favorable to stakeholders as it may 
reduce the funding burden. However, this may not be completed without associated 
challenges.  
51 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Guidelines. Washington, 
DC, 2007.   
52  State of Washington Department of Health, Disaster in Japan Incident Response- March 2011 to 
May 2011, Event After Action Report/ Improvement Plan, July 29, 2011, 47.  
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For example, due to federal funding mechanisms, individual entity budgeting and 
funding requirements, as well as liability and resource depletion concerns, entities may 
resist building formal partnerships for response to a major event, particularly if they 
consider a major event unlikely. More specifically, mutual aid agreements often dictate 
reimbursement and liability assignments. Unfortunately, despite the well-known 
catastrophic impact a radiological event can have, such events are often perceived as too 
low in probability to warrant dedicated resource allocations, planning time and 
partnership building.   
C. FEDERAL GUIDANCE 
Coordination of recovery planning for radiological-nuclear incidents requires 
federal guidance to provide states and localities with a framework for developing their 
own recovery strategies.53 The lack of effective guidance or the mere existence of such 
guidance is of noticeable concern. In 2010, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) conducted an extensive review of existing federal guidance to include federal law, 
presidential directives, and other executive guidance.54  An interview was conducted 
with officials from DHS, Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), DOE and EPA national laboratories.55  Additionally, the GAO 
conducted a survey of emergency management officials in cities, states and federal 
offices.56  The review resulted in a significant finding, that FEMA has not completed 
planning to help cities and states recover from Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD) or 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) incidents.57 
53 United States Government Accountability Office (2009). Combating Nuclear Terrorism: 
Preliminary Observations On Preparedness To Recover From Possible Attacks Using Radiological Or 
Nuclear Materials (GAO-09-996T). Retrieved from U.S. Government Printing Office, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123278.pdf 
54 United States Government Accountability Office (2010). Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Actions 
Needed To Better Prepare To Recover From Possible Attacks Using Radiological Materials (GAO-10-





                                                 
Within the aforementioned GAO report, it was stated that “a senior FEMA 
planning official told the GAO that because FEMA is already aware that its planning 
system does not fully recognize the involvement of state and local governments, the 
agency is developing regional support plans.”58  However, such support plans have not 
come to fruition. Despite the federal government’s own requirements to test and exercise 
plans, the GAO determined that federal agencies have conducted few exercises to test 
radiological recovery plans.59  Exercising radiological response is an opportunity to not 
only test plans, but also provide an opportunity to identify agencies that may have a role 
or responsibility in collaborative planning to strengthen radiological capabilities. 
Federal guidance is essential in limiting confusion among state and local 
emergency management officials regarding federal agency responsibilities to provide 
assistance. Confusion can certainly hinder timely recovery from radiological incidents. 
Moreover, this issue has led to an apparent deficiency in health- related organizations 
understanding of their roles in radiological planning and response.  
For example, in a roundtable conducted by the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) and the National Center for Environmental Health in 2010, discussions 
were facilitated with multiple Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and public health 
agency representatives.60 The result was a determination that many of the participants 
did not understand what roles they would have in managing and recovering from a 
radiological event.61  Aside from not understanding individual roles and responsibilities 
in a radiological event, some participants had no idea that their departments would even 
be involved.”62  The roundtable highlighted the fact that collaboration is critical to 
response in a radiological emergency, as local resources alone, would not be adequate. 
58 Ibid. 
59 United States Government Accountability Office (2010). Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Actions 
Needed To Better Prepare To Recover From Possible Attacks Using Radiological Materials (GAO-10-
204). Retrieved from U.S. Government Printing Office, http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/301288.pdf. 
60 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Environmental Health (2010). 






                                                 
The recommendation was made that additional policies and guidance should be 
developed to address the scope of potential events ranging from local and regional to 
statewide.63  
With a lack of guidance from the federal overarching entities, state and local 
divisions are creating their own planning documents resulting in an inconsistency across 
disciplines, as coordination and collaboration is limited or nonexistent. For example, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) developed a CBRNE consequence management plan. 
However, it has not been integrated with other federal government plans.64   
Existing general strategy guidance, such as the National Planning Frameworks 
(NPF), provide roles and responsibilities for the whole community. However, it serves 
only as a generic guide for local planners, who must be empowered to implement the 
concepts of such guidance in local plans and strategies. While the NPF makes many 
recommendations regarding the whole community approach, the guidance is very general 
and often states that partners should include multilevel government, community and faith 
based organizations. Specific guidance on how to do so remains inadequate and lacks 
clarity. This may be due to the lack of partnerships of federal planning and policy 
authorities with those at local levels.  
According to a study conducted by the GAO, local response disciplines prefer the 
federal government to consult with them in the initial formulation of a recovery strategy 
through inclusion in working and focus groups.65 The report notes that emergency 
management officials at both the state and local levels are in need of more intelligence 
information on RDD and IND threats, as sharing information with law enforcement 
agencies is necessary for appropriate planning for RDD or IND incidents.66 
63 Ibid. 
64 United States Government Accountability Office (2009). Preliminary observations on defense 
chemical, biological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives consequence management plans and preparedness 
(GAO-09-927T). Retrieved from U.S. Government Printing Office, 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=34851. 
65 United States Government Accountability Office (2009). Combating Nuclear Terrorism: 
Preliminary Observations on Preparedness to Recover from Possible Attacks Using Radiological or 




                                                 
D. INFORMATION SHARING 
The Department of Homeland Security defines information sharing as “the ability 
to exchange intelligence, information, data, or knowledge among local, state, tribal, 
territorial, and Federal governments, private sector entities, or international partners as 
appropriate.”67 The Intelligence and Information Sharing capability is critical to 
radiological response planning, and involves  
…the effective implementation of the intelligence cycle and information 
integration process … by the whole community (to include local, state, 
tribal, territorial, and Federal intelligence entities, the private sector, the 
public, and international partners, as appropriate), … to develop 
situational awareness on the actor(s), method(s), means, weapon(s), or 
target(s) related to an imminent terrorist threat within the United States.68  
Information sharing is a key element in collaborative planning for radiological 
response, mitigation, resilience and recovery. As such, there have been several 
improvements in federal policy. For example, Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458) supports United States 
counterterrorism activities. Executive Order 13388 issued in 2005, further strengthened 
the sharing of terrorism information to protect Americans.69   
Additionally, the WMD Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2011 (H.R. 
2764) directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), “to undertake various activities to combat the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction and to share related reports with federal, state, local, and 
tribal authorities as well as other stakeholders.”70 Despite these improvements in federal 
policy, literature examining the operational strategy for ensuring effective information- 
sharing through collaborative methods is sparse. Moreover, there is a paucity of research 
on cross-sector capabilities to seamlessly collect, blend, analyze, disseminate, and use 
67 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Prevention Framework. Washington, 
DC, 2013.   
68 Ibid.   
69 Federal Register. “Executive Order 13388 - Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism 




                                                 
information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences in support of 
radiological preparedness. 
Existing literature supports the premise that each new piece of intelligence 
enhances the identification, definition and scope of the threat environment, information 
necessary for discerning what associated capabilities must be developed to prevent, 
disrupt and recover from a threat event. Additionally, actionable intelligence can initiate 
the execution of pre-planned response capabilities already identified and enabled.71  
The intelligence and warning mission area covers activities to detect terrorist 
threats and disseminate terrorist-threat information. The category includes intelligence 
collection, risk analysis, and threat-vulnerability integration activities for preventing 
terrorist attacks. It also includes information sharing activities among federal, state and 
local governments, relevant private sector entities (particularly custodians of critical 
infrastructure), and the public at large. The major requirements addressed in the 
intelligence and warning mission area include: 1) unifying and enhancing intelligence 
and analytical capabilities to ensure officials have the information they need to prevent 
attacks and 2) implementing the Homeland Security Advisory System and other 
information sharing and warning mechanisms to follow federal, state, local and private 
authorities to take action to prevent attacks and protect potential targets.72 
With accurate, timely, and relevant intelligence, responding partners can respond 
with precision and speed. U.S. intelligence must learn more about American institutions 
as partners while seeking to educate the American people about intelligence.73  U.S. 
intelligence needs cohesive leadership plus a centralized and locally networked domestic 
structure in order to work with the American public. It would not be advisable to ignore 
the need for intelligence at home, create ad hoc and unsupervised entities, rely 
exclusively on the externally focused Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or substitute 
71 Davis, Paul K., Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis, 
and Transformation. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002. 
72 United States Government Accountability Office (2005). Agency Plans, Implementation, and 
Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security (GAO-05-33). Retrieved from U.S. 
Government Printing Office, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-33.    
73 Sims, Jennifer E., and Burton Gerber. Transforming U.S. Intelligence. Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005. 
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law enforcement for intelligence. U.S. intelligence and other American institutions need 
each other to defend the homeland through a strategic partnership, one that matches 
America’s potential with foreign intelligence collection opportunities at home and 
abroad. A call should be made for greater responsiveness and warning from U.S. 
intelligence to the homeland.   
The U.S. private sector can help guide U.S. intelligence into unfamiliar areas and 
new ways of doing business. This kind of collaboration makes sense for many reasons, to 
include the growing number and complexity of topics that must be covered. A challenge 
to this rests with U.S. intelligence, under informed executive leadership and constructive 
legislative oversight, to understand private-sector partners and construct the right 
interdependent links.74  
Planners would be well advised to ensure that communication plans, procedures 
and processes clearly state how, when and what information will be exchanged between 
partners and communicated to stakeholders.75 Additionally, a process should be 
established for responding to conflicting decisions, misinformation and rumors as they 
can present significant challenges to the protection of the public’s health and safety. 
Planners should identify and maintain a list of stakeholders and partners who will receive 
emergency risk communication products in advance of mass distribution to ensure 
message continuity and accuracy.76 A communications strategy should ensure that timely 
and accurate information as well as clear and understandable advice is made available to 
stakeholders early in the response and routinely repeated and updated before, during and 
after a radiological event.77  
74 Ibid. 
75 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 
Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency Agency 
(2010): 1–69. 
76 Covello, V.T. “Developing an Emergency Risk Communication (ERC)/Joint Information Center 
(JIC) Plan for a Radiological Emergency.”   Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (February 
2011): 1–172, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=4482 
77 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 
Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency Agency 
(2010): 1–69. 
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V. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING OVERVIEW 
A. COMPONENTS AND PROCESS 
The Capabilities-Based Preparedness (CBP) process is rooted in multi-
disciplinary, cross-governmental, and regional collaboration. The CBP approach may 
assist in determining measurable radiological response targets, assessment of current 
preparedness capabilities as well as identifying and addressing areas of improvement 
with respect to planning, training and exercising for radiological events.78 Additionally, a 
new model for cross-sector collaborative planning, in combination with the capabilities-
based approach, can serve as a framework for management and organization of limited 
resources.79  Under such framework, disciplines would be encouraged to expand and 
diversify their preparedness missions, as well as optimize output.   
Capabilities-based planning may be defined as “planning, under uncertainty, to 
provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and 
circumstances, while working within an economic framework.”80  While the concept of 
capabilities-based planning is rarely discussed in public policy literature, the concept 
should be looked at more closely for application in radiological response planning, as 
such capabilities deal with a great measure of uncertainty and surprise.81  
Previous methods of radiological response planning have primarily focused on the 
traditional threat-based approach.82  While suggestions for implementation of a 
capabilities-based planning strategy have been proposed in the past, it is only recently 
78 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Guidelines, Washington, 
DC, 2007.   
79 Fitzsimmons, M (2007). Whither capabilities-based planning?. Joint Force Quarterly, 44, 101–105. 
Retrieved from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=711647. 
80 Davis, Paul K., Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis, 
and Transformation. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002.  
81 (2002). Alternative Futures Approach to Nuclear Deterrence Planning: Capabilities Based 
Planning for the New Triad. Retrieved from Systems Planning and Analysis, Incorporated : 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=441412. 
 82 Committee on Naval Analytical Capabilities and Improving Capabilities-Based Planning. “Naval  
Analytical Capabilities: Improving Capabilities-Based Planning.” National Research Council of the  
National Academies (National Academies Press), 2005: 1–102 
http://proxy.buffalostate.edu:2055/lib/buffalostate/docDetail.action. 
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that consideration has been given to recommendations for revising current policy.83  For 
example, the United States Quadrennial Defense Review has moved from a threat-based, 
country-specific approach to a non-country-specific continuum of capabilities.84 This 
transformation has changed the basic United States force planning philosophy to a 
capabilities-based planning approach. However, despite such advancements, new 
planning methodologies still need to be fully developed.  
The development of such planning methodologies is quite challenging as there is 
a difference between national interests and local interests. The national interest focuses 
on high impact threats and hazards, while the local interest takes a stochastic approach, 
focusing on high probability threats and hazards. Risk factors, such as threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence can be managed to a certain degree; however, the higher 
the impact an event may have the greater the uncertainty regarding the probability of such 
an event. The direct correlation between impact and uncertainty poses a significant 
challenge to homeland security planning, given the differences in national and local 
interests. As federal guidance is often focused on high impact threat, when states and 
localities attempt to adopt or implement such planning, there are significant challenges as 
such planning does not specifically address high probability events. 
 
Figure 2.  Risk-Based All-Hazards Approach85 
83Davis, Paul K., Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission Systems Analysis, 
and Transformation. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Publication MR 1513, 2002 
84 Kahan, Jerome H., Tindal, Zavadil, Stephen W., The New U.S. Strategic Framework and 
Capabilities-based Planning: Application to Strategic Force Planning, June 2003 
85 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Goal. Washington, DC, 
2006.    
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At the local level, with the priority often being on high probability events, it is 
essential to enable officials to make informed choices that best strengthen capabilities. 
The Capabilities-Based Preparedness Process as depicted in Figure 3, emphasizes the 
integration of collaboration throughout several necessary steps to identify, achieve, and 
sustain target levels of a capability. The steps in Figure 3 may be integrated to better plan 
for radiological preparedness. The eight (8) steps must be followed in sequence as the 
processes and tools are combined to firstly identify and prioritize measurable 
preparedness targets in assessing current capabilities, and secondly to allocate available 
resources with emphasis on the most urgently needed capabilities based on risk.86  
 
 





                                                 
The following section details the Capabilities-Based Preparedness Process as a 
framework for implementing the Capabilities Based Planning model for radiological 
planning. The model sets requirements and measures through a scenario-analysis process. 
The radiological response planning scenario is ideal in this process as it is specific and 
long-term. Utilization of the Capabilities Based Planning model allows for decision 
makers to select options, and make final determinations through multiple levels of 
analysis and decision-making.88 Additionally, the model provides the opportunity for 
planners to consider a set of options to meet operations needs and/or outcomes. 
Capability Based Planning addresses risk management through direct intelligence 
regarding potential catastrophic events, analyzing capabilities across uncertain 
circumstances and risk characteristics, and then forming investment choices about how to 
achieve key objectives.89  
88 Ibid. 
89 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Mitigation Framework. Washington, 
DC, 2013.   
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF A CAPABILITIES-BASED 
PLANNING MODEL 
A. APPLICATION OF CBP IN RADIOLOGICAL PLANNING 
The Capabilities Based Planning (CBP) model provides a conceptual framework 
for planning under the uncertainty of a radiological event, by emphasizing capability 
flexibility, robustness, and ability to adapt.90  The implementation of such a model may 
allow for localities to better understand not only the threat and potential impact of a 
radiological event, but also to examine radiological response capability needs, assessment 
of radiological response options, as well as the ability to make choices based on multiple 
factors including risk, resources and economic limitations.91   
A capabilities-based approach to contingency planning is inherently flexible and 
has the additional advantage of facilitating the planning process by ease of 
comprehension and explanation. The capabilities-based approach to planning can be 
adapted and adopted in part or in total by any organization involved in radiological 
preparedness. All levels within an organization can use the same planning process to 
formalize the passing of threat assessments, operational plans, and resourcing decisions 
up and down organizational leadership.  
The eight (8) steps in CBP include convening a working group, determining 
capability targets, assessing current capability levels, identifying, analyzing and choosing 
options, updating plans and strategies, as well as conducting assessment and reporting. 
Such steps may be further defined to examine how they may be executed within the 
realm of radiological emergency response and planning at the local level.  
Diversification of participants within a working group is essential, as 
responsibility for radiological response capabilities can be assigned to specific agencies 
and organizations that may further sub- divide, and designate responsibilities and tasks to 
specific divisions, teams and resources. This would allow planners at all levels to share a 




                                                 
comprehensive response plan that then could be tested in multidisciplinary exercises. 
Agencies would evaluate existing resources, capabilities and missions to identify what 
their roles and responsibilities would potentially be when responding to a radiological 
event. A workgroup may serve to facilitate problem solving, improve access to resources, 
and foster coordination and information sharing.92 A workgroup would also serve to 
generate an understanding of the overall emergency management structure, the roles and 
responsibilities of their individual organizations and their relation to other organizations 
and jurisdictions within the management structure.93 
Collaboration will be enhanced with the implementation of a coordinating 
structure, which ensures ongoing communication and coordination among federal, state, 
local, tribal, nonprofit and private sector organizations. Coordinating structures such as 
the example in Figure 4 are in accordance with the whole community approach. The 
structure brings together those entities involved in conducting activities and operations, to 
address the requirements of the radiological response mission, and to serve in both a 
readiness and operational roles.94 Additionally, the coordinating structure would support 
the Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery mission areas outlined in 




93 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 
Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency Agency 
(2010): 1–69. 
94 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Mitigation Framework. Washington, 
DC, 2013.   
95 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Goal. Washington, DC, 
2006.    
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Figure 4. Example of Coordinating Structure96 
 
Once a locality has established a working group, the participants would work with 
their emergency manager and state emergency management office in determining the 
jurisdiction’s risk-based target level for radiological emergency response. The workgroup 
may use the Department of Homeland Security Target Capabilities List (TCL), such as 
those outlined in section II B, and National Preparedness Guidelines as a tool/guide.97  
Planners would be encouraged to balance the risk-based target level with both available 
resources and those that can be realistically acquired through regional collaboration.  
With the risk-based target level identified, the workgroup would assess current 
capability levels. The working group would be charged with coordinating a detailed 
comparison of current capabilities with the risk-based target capability identified in the 
previous step. The outcome of such a comparison should assist in identifying areas for 
96 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Mitigation Framework. Washington, 
DC, 2013, 23 
97 United States. Department of Homeland Security. Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the 
National Preparedness Guidelines. 2007.    
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improvement, or gaps.98  The working group should also consider regional multi-agency 
coordination (i.e., mutual aid, acquisition through contracting, and resources from 
nongovernmental and private sector partners) as a resource for enhancing capabilities.   
Following the assessment of the current capability levels, methods must then be 
identified and analyzed to address the areas for improvement. Specific needs will require 
a combination of resources. The workgroup may utilize the TCL as a guide to apply 
analytical processes to select alternative combinations of resources or solution sets for 
each area of improvement.99 Senior decision makers will also consider strategic concerns 
and implications to include potential costs as well as the forecasted impact on planning. 
A jurisdiction specific radiological response plan should be developed, as well as 
updated and revised with the participating agency roles and responsibilities, in addition to 
the identified strategies chosen. As many guidelines change with time, the workgroup 
should ensure that the plan is aligned with the National Preparedness Guidelines and is 
compliant with National Incident Management System (NIMS).100 As a living document, 
the plan should be reviewed and exercised annually.  
Resources identified as necessary and outstanding will require decision-makers to 
review budgets and funding requests. Identifying current or potential sources of funding 
will be necessary to determine feasibility of acquiring certain resources and prioritizing 
acquisitions. With an effective and regionally coordinated preparedness portfolio, 
jurisdictions will need to work closely with partnering counties as well as states to satisfy 
prioritized resources.  
To deliver an effective emergency management and public health response, it is 
necessary to make, maintain and exercise adequate plans and arrangements in advance of 
98 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Mitigation Framework. Washington, 
DC, 2013.   Or can be accessed at https://s3-us-gov-west-1.amazonaws.com/dam-
production/uploads/20130726-1914-25045-9956/final_national_mitigation_framework_20130501.pdf. 
99 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Mitigation Framework. Washington, 
DC, 2013.   Or can be accessed at https://s3-us-gov-west-1.amazonaws.com/dam-
production/uploads/20130726-1914-25045-9956/final_national_mitigation_framework_20130501.pdf. 
100 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Guidelines. Washington, 
DC, 2007.   
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an emergency situation.101 Radiological preparedness and response plans should be not 
only updated but also executed.102  
Execution focuses on the following:  
• Administering programs 
• Conducting planning and coordination  
• Purchasing equipment in accordance with documented needs and specified 
standards, as well as preparing and maintaining such equipment to be readily 
available as needed  
• Developing and conducting training to fill capability gaps  
• Developing and conducting exercises to demonstrate performance 
 




Figure 5. CBP for Radiological Training and Exercises103 
101 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 
Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency Agency 
(2010): 1–69.  
102 United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Mitigation Framework. Washington, 
DC, 2013.   
103 Ibid. 
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Regular assessments are essential to providing a continuously validated baseline 
for radiological preparedness. The assessment process includes capability (as described 
previously), compliance, and performance assessments to determine preparedness of 
individual partners and levels of government. Performance and compliance assessments 
serve to validate levels of capability. Compliance assessments provide insight into 
conformance with requirements (i.e. NIMS). Performance assessments are conducted 
through exercise programs such as the example in Figure 5.  
B. EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING 
The CBP approach to decision making can facilitate timely, effective and 
compatible decision making by response organizations at every level.104 Decision 
making is at the very core of the emergency management cycle, and therefore should be 
addressed to ensure effectiveness for radiological events. According to the Nuclear 
Emergency Agency, decision making should be guided by the inclusion of several key 
strategic elements:105 
• Examination of the depth of preparedness by conducting a threat and risk 
assessment that looks at all possible nuclear and radiological emergencies in 
terms of their origin, probability of occurrence and magnitude of impacts 
• Anticipating when a decision will be necessary and identifying what information 
will be needed to support such decision 
• Coordination of communications to ensure organized and timely decision making 
among key leaders 
• Engagement and inclusion of stakeholders in development of protection strategies 
 
 Local planners would be well advised to implement the aforementioned 
considerations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the emergency management 
cycle. As decision making occurs throughout the emergency management cycle, 
    104 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for 
Effective Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency 
Agency (2010): 1–69.  
105 Ibid. 
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stakeholder input may be appropriate to each of the following elements in the general 
planning process (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6.  Planning Process106 
A radiological event would enhance the complexity of decision making, as it 
would increase and expand the multiple layers of participants in the overall emergency 
management structure with various roles and authorities.107 Therefore, the possible 
change in the relationship between such organizations or inclusion of different partners 
should be considered in pre-planning and exercising efforts. A whole community 
approach to the integration of multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary partners may be 
integral to ensure coordination during an actual event. Key elements that may be adopted 
include: identification of how organizations at all levels will interact, where the decision-
106 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 
Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency Agency 
(2010): 1–69. 
107  Ibid. 
 35 
                                                 
making authorities reside and if and how these will change depending on the type of 
event or its severity.108 As with all planning efforts, such structure should be formally 
documented, exercised and supported by all participants and stakeholders.  
C. FACTORS IMPACTING IMPLEMENTATION 
Aside from the many benefits of a capabilities based planning approach, there are 
also associated challenges to its successful implementation.109  Three (3) significant 
challenges for implementation include stakeholder buy-in, leader(s) support and 
involvement, as well as resource development and leveraging.110   
1. Stakeholder Buy-In 
One of the first requirements for successful implementation of Capabilities Based 
Planning (CBP) is collaborative stakeholder involvement. Stakeholder involvement is an 
important component in the development and optimization of protection strategies for 
emergency situations.111 Additionally, education and training of stakeholders, with 
respect to planning arrangements, may also prove to be highly beneficial.112  
Organizations and individuals that will be affected by the emergency situation and 
will be involved in or affected by its management may be considered stakeholders for 
planning purposes.113 A special consideration should be made to include those not 
typically involved, such as non-governmental organizations, private sector and the 
public.114 Planners would be well advised to include a broad range of stakeholders to 
108 Ibid. 
109 Walker, Colonel Stephen K. Capabilities-Based Planning — How it is Intended to Work and 
Challenges to its Successful Implementation. USAWC Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army  
War College, 2005, 1–37. 
110 Ibid. 
111 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 






                                                 
facilitate effective emergency management in complex emergency situations.115 A 
stakeholder’s role and degree of involvement would depend on the type of stakeholder, 
and how he or she may be affected by an emergency situation, including possible 
preparedness and response roles.116  
Stakeholders generally control the information, resources, and authority required 
to support CBP, and therefore, their requirements must be considered from the outset. To 
gain stakeholder buy-in, one must understand and address the criticisms and flaws of the 
CBP concept being presented. Issues may be mitigated by discussing how lessons learned 
from previous disasters may be incorporated as well as how comprehensive assessments, 
plans, systems and capabilities for preparedness at the state and local level may be 
included. 
A significant challenge to securing stakeholder buy-in is leader anticipation that 
the entire nation would contribute to the response and recovery for a large-scale event 
within his/her community. Local political leaders often make the assumption that Federal 
and State partners will have the resources and ability to assist in the event of a disaster. 
This overreliance results in a lack of community planning for terrorist attack scenarios, as 
jurisdiction leaders believe such events are highly unlikely to occur. High impact threats 
and hazards may also be viewed as national in scope, necessitating a coordinated national 
approach. This “national response view” creates a detailed “one size fits all” national 
standard requirement for every jurisdiction.  
Local decision-making should be done within a national context of building and 
maintaining capabilities necessary for prevention, response, and recovery from both 
large-scale and smaller all-hazards incidents. Stakeholders must be included in 
Capabilities Based Planning to ensure that their requirements and concerns are 
considered. Key stakeholders will eventually control the planning process, and it is 
therefore important that they feel they have ownership of it. It is also important to ensure 
that stakeholders have an understanding of each other’s perspectives and an appreciation 




                                                 
Stakeholder incorporation into information flow is also critical to response. As in 
the Washington State Department of Health response to the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear 
Power Plan disaster, incorporation of key stakeholders such as Health and Human 
Services, regional partners, Department of Health, and tribal nations was integral to 
maintaining situational awareness and streamlining public information.117 As mentioned 
in the Washington State Department of Health After Action Report, sharing information 
via conference calls strengthened coordination and enhanced efficiency. Additionally, it 
gave state health more information for decisions that needed to be made with regard to 
the response. Stakeholders may make better decisions and be more confident in such 
decision if they are included in many of the discussions. This may especially be true for 
the Capabilities Based Approach as it builds off of good partnerships, coordination and 
collaboration.  
Following the crisis phase of a radiological event, little stakeholder interaction 
may occur due to the urgency of actions to prevent severe radiological harm. However, 
interaction with stakeholders would increase as other issues begin to be addressed and 
resolved. For many countermeasures that may be considered by the emergency manager 
(i.e., evacuation, sheltering indoors, iodine prophylaxis, sheltering or and/or feeding 
restrictions on livestock), stakeholders outside of the formal emergency management 
structure will play an important role. Often times, restrictions on agricultural production, 
transportation, or behavior modification cannot be imposed on stakeholders by response 
officials; therefore, stakeholder involvement in the development of such actions is 
integral to the acceptability of them.118  
2. Leaders Support and Involvement 
Leaders may share the concern that radiological response plans are too detailed 
and rigid. Rather than approving the execution and “sitting back and watching,” leaders 
should be involved throughout the process of plan development, training and exercising. 
117 Roberts, Shawn, and Al Conklin. “Disaster in Japan Incident Response.” Washington State 
Department of Health After Action Report/Improvement Plan (2011). 
118 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 
Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency Agency 
(2010): 1–69. 
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Involvement in plan development is important as plans and procedures help guide leaders 
through a response and help them understand the implications of each decision.119 
Facilitated workshops involving key stakeholders and leaders may be greatly beneficial 
in enhancing leadership input and understanding. The use of workshops may also provide 
a forum for stakeholders and leaders to discuss their concerns with planners and come to 
a common understanding of the process. Leadership involvement can extend past 
participation in meetings, and include observation of training and exercises. 
Leadership involvement is integral for effective and efficient information sharing. 
As key decision makers, leaders must be apprised of their community’s risk, possible 
radiological impacts of an incident, and what resources are needed for response. 
Education and open communication to partners and the public are essential to success of 
radiological preparedness. Timely information sharing is key to mitigating gaps in 
communication as well as leader disconnection from other agencies.120 Another 
consideration for leader support and involvement is control for turnover. Constant 
involvement is important to ensure new leaders are properly apprised key information. 
3. Resource Development and Leveraging 
With an all hazard planning requirement, local jurisdictions may find it difficult to 
identify, secure and maintain resources for radiological response. Most jurisdictions do 
not have the resources to develop the knowledge base on radiation.121 Partnerships with 
multiple disciplines and agencies, such as the Office of Radiation Protection, may 
enhance awareness with meeting and/or trainings. Building awareness of what resources 
are available is important, in addition to maintaining relationships with such partners and 
establishing Memoranda of Understanding/Agreement to formalize what is expected of 
each party.  
119 Roberts, Shawn, and Al Conklin. “Disaster in Japan Incident Response.” Washington State 
Department of Health After Action Report/Improvement Plan (2011). 
120 Roberts, Shawn, and Al Conklin. “Disaster in Japan Incident Response.” Washington State 
Department of Health After Action Report/Improvement Plan (2011). 
121 Ibid. 
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An all hazard and all threats approach may best be met with a whole community 
approach. In many situations, emergency management and homeland security operations 
start at the local level and expand to include Federal, state, territorial, tribal, regional, and 
private sector assets as the affected jurisdiction requires additional resources and 
capabilities.122 Plans must, therefore, integrate vertically to ensure a common operational 
focus, as well as horizontally to ensure that individual departments and agencies 
understand, accept, and is prepared to execute identified assignments.123  
The Capabilities Based Planning model involves the process of matching threat 
capabilities and counter capabilities, which intentionally facilitates a decision-making 
judgment on resources versus risks. The building blocks of capabilities require a set 
amount of resources to mitigate the risk of the threat capability they are built to counter. 
Where no counter capabilities exist, mitigating long-term risks require investment and 
research strategies to develop what is required.  
122 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations 




                                                 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A. CONCLUSION 
Existing literature on radiological response planning indicates that emergency 
response efforts will continue to be disparate if a lack of effective coordination across 
governmental jurisdictions, communities, and the health and emergency response systems 
remains. It is difficult to assess whether the U.S. approach is adequate or if more needs to 
be done because the overall metrics for success have not been determined.124 While the 
GAO has developed recommendations, there is a paucity of literature illustrating if, when 
and how actualization of such recommendations occurred.125  
It remains however, that radiological events are unique hazards, requiring 
sufficient time, effort and resources. Preparedness for such events require sufficiently 
robust, flexible, understood and exercised plans to allow decision makers and supporting 
staff to use and synthesize the required knowledge and experience when in the mist of the 
response for each emergency situation.126 To deliver an effective response, it is 
necessary to make, maintain and exercise adequate plans and arrangements in advance of 
an emergency situation.127  
 Planners are challenged by the unfortunate fact that radiological events often 
occur with no notice and require broad scenario planning to cover the many complex 
possibilities as a result of such an event. Agencies, organizations and relevant 
stakeholders are faced with increased demand that timely and effective actions be taken 
to mitigate consequences on populations, infrastructure and environment.  
 
124 A. Mauroni, “Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?,” Homeland Security Affairs 8, no. 9 (2012): 
1–14. Retrieved from http://www.hsaj.org  
125 Ibid. 
126  “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 
Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency Agency 
(2010): 1–69. 
127 Ibid.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Strategic planning cannot be approached with the common concept that a rigid 
and orderly implementation process exists that will effectively and efficiently address all 
challenges and barriers to successful radiological preparedness efforts. Radiological 
response planning requires formal comprehensive plans that incorporate a wide span of 
partners and is exercised and practiced on a regular basis. Local planners would be well 
advised to first address the jurisdictions risk to such a hazard and secondly evaluate the 
status of existing assets. It is understood that long-term culture, system, habit, and skill 
changes cannot be effectively addressed with force. To truly set forth change, individual 
agencies and organizations must first look at how they may build coordination and 
enhance information sharing between and among other partners.  
 Local Emergency Managers are well suited to spearhead the effort to enhance 
coordination and collaboration. Specific attention should be given to information sharing 
across multiple agencies/organizations as well as disciplines. The Capabilities Based 
Planning Model may be utilized by local planners as a framework to enhance planning 
and associated decisions made by all partners involved in local radiological planning 
efforts. Information sharing, stakeholder involvement and collaboration among many 
organizations should be addressed up front in the planning process in order to put all 
required operational arrangements in place, to facilitate appropriate and timely decisions, 
and to effectively manage resources.128  
What remains to be found is the proper evaluation of radiological response 
planning, as its current state is factually uncertain. While well-defined strategies such as 
the capabilities-based planning model have not been thoroughly tested to date, the core 
elements of the model may be implemented by local emergency managers within his/her 
jurisdiction to build coordination and collaboration.  
128 “Strategic Aspects of Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Management: Planning for Effective 
Decision Making Consequence Management and Transition to Recovery.” Nuclear Emergency Agency 
(2010): 1–69. 
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